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M. L. McBride, Editor
Entered as Second Class matter, Dec. 9, 1936, at the Postoffice at
Dickinson, North Dakota, Under the Act of August 24, 1912.
VOL. 17. APRIL, 1941. NO. 5.
THE LAYMAN AS HIS OWN LAWYER
The attempt of the layman to be his own lawyer, is
not restricted to the making of Wills. In the recent
case of Hathy-vs.-Mathy, 291 NW 761, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin says:
"The plaintiff asks in an amended complaint for
reformation of the original deed on the ground of mis-
take. But there is no evidence of any mistake in the
drafting of it. None of the parties to the instrument
testified to any mistake. It was perhaps a mistake
to have had the deed drawn by one not a lawyer, but
that is the kind of a mistake for the correction of
which no remedy has yet been found."
The attorneys argued the lack of legal sequence in
the language of the deed as affecting its legality, and
the court said,-"It would be necessary to bear in
mind in determining the meaning of the deed, that
when the instrument is drawn on a printed form, writ-
ten or typed portions of it are more strongly indica-
tive of intent than seemingly inconsistent of the print-
ed portion. Such provisions are likely to be inserted,
especially by unskilled scriveners. wherever there is a
blank space -to insert them rather than where in legal
sequence they properly belong."
Well, one might say,-All right, this sort of con-
veyancing makes work for the lawyers, and plenty of
it where it goes to the Court of last resort as it did in
the above case, but on the other hand it is an imposi-
tion upon the parties, and an infringment of the rights
of attorneys and unauthorized practice. But today in
this state it is a common practice for clerks to draw
wills, and do conveyancing. It is difficult to fix the
violation on the party; we are receiving much better
cooperation from the banks as a whole than ever be-
fore but as to others it is just the same.
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ANNUAL MEETING-SUGGESTIONS
The next annual meeting of the State Bar Association will be
held at Bismarck, N. D., on September 18th and 19th, 1941,
under the auspices of the Burleigh County Bar Association.
The plan inaugurated at the annual meeting last year at
Fargo of a short legal institute will be continued under the joint
guidance of the committee on the Legal Institute of which George
A. Soule of Fargo is chairman, the local committee of the Burleigh
County Bar, and your state officers.
And at this time we need the cooperation of the members in
suggesting topics that they wish to have presented on this pro-
gram, as well as lawyers who, in their judgment, are qualified to
present practical discussions of their particular fields of law prac-
tice. Such suggestions can be sent to your secretary at the office
of the association at Dickinson, N. D.
NAVIGABLE WATERS - WHAT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION IS A NAVIGABLE STREAM
This is an action by the United States to enjoin the
construction of a dam on the New River in Virginia without a
license from the Federal Power Commission, as provided for in
the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. The respondent sets forth
the following defenses: (1) That the New River is non-navigable;
(2) That should the New River be declared navigable the con-
ditions of any federal license must be strictly limited to the pro-
tection of the navigable capacity of the waters of the United
States; (3) That the Commission's refusal to grant a minor part
license containing only such conditions was unlawful, and that
any relief should be conditioned upon the Commission's granting
respondent such a license. Held, the New River is navigable and
subject to federal control under the delegated powers in the Com-
merce Clause. (2) That the term navigation as construed cov-
ers more than just the control of the waterway itself. The Court
states that the power is as broad as the needs of commerce, and
that navigable waters are the subject of natural control and
planning is the broad regulation of commerce granted to the fed-
eral government. (3) That the license may contain these pro-
visions which the Commission may deem necessary in the exer-
cise of supervision and control over such navigable waters.
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 61 S. Ct.
291 (1940).
The above decision is the farthest the Supreme Court has
ever gone by judicial construction in advancing the development
of the federal control over rivers. The rule followed up to the
time of this case was found in this Court's decision in The Daniel
Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1868), stated as follows: "Those
rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
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are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary con-
dition, as highways of commerce, over which trade and travel
are, or may be, conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the
United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the state, when
they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by unit-
ing with other waters, a continued highway over which com-
merce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign coun-
tries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conduct-
ed by water." This rule from The Daniel Ball case was the basis
of the holding by the District Court and by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, to the effect that the New River was not navigable. The
early common law rule was that all rivers affected by the ebb
and flow of the tides were navigable. Grand Rapids and Indiana
Railroad Company v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 15 S. Ct. 991, 40 L. Ed.
85 (1895). But this rule has not found wide acceptance in the
United States and Canada because of the great fresh water lakes
and inland rivers found so commonly here, as to which the
common law rule was inapplicable. In The Montello, 20 Wall. 450,
22 L. Ed. 391 (1853), the court held that the probability of use of
waterway by the public for purposes of transportation and com-
merce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river.
In the Economy Light and Power Company v. United States, 256
U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 409, 65 L. Ed. 847 (1920), the Court said
navigability does not depend on the type of use or the difficulties
attending navigation, such as falls, rapids, and sandbars, even
though these be so great that they prevent the use of the best
means of commerce. It is dependent rather upon whether the
stream in its natural state is such that it affords a channel for
useful commerce.
Among the considerations of prime importance in the de-
termination of the navigability of rivers are: First-Its natural
navigability. This is essential; no legislative enactment can de-
clare a stream to be navigable when it is not so in its natural
state. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 37 S. Ct. 380, 61 L.
Ed. 746 (1916). Secondly-The depth or capacity for floatage.
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197,
70 L. Ed. 465 (1925). Thirdly-In general, a stream must be
used for trade or agriculture rather than for mere pleasure, and
must be capable of sustaining more than a mere rowboat to be
termed a navigable stream. North American Drege Company
v. Mintzer, 245 Fed. 297, 157 C. C. A. 489 (1917). Fourthly-
In order for a stream to be classified as navigable it need not be
navigable in its entirety. It can be navigable in part only, and
still be regarded as navigable in the parts that are navigable..
St. Anthony Falls Water Company v. St. Paul Water Commission,
168 U. S. 349, 118 S. Ct. 157, 42 L. Ed. 497 (1897). A stream
that can be made navigable is navigable within the meaning of
the constitution, and the true test of navigability is the capacity
of the stream to be used after improvement for the purposes of
transportation and commerce.. This is a question of fact, the
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burden of establishing such resting upon the party affirming it.
Charles L. Barnes v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 7 (1910).
Among the powers delegated to the federal government by
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution is the exclusive control
of the navigable waters of the United States. The expansion of
the nation, the development of the scope of the constitution by
judicial construction, and, finally, the powers assumed by the
federal government, because of the exigencies of the great war,
have all contributed to the development of an extreme federal at-
titude, a tendency toward federal control over rivers and lakes
without regard for the rights of the states to control non-navi-
gable waters. The precedents of the Supreme Court have uni-
formily tended towards the enlargement of federal authority and
the whittling away of the powers of the states. Le Beouf, State
or Federal Control of the Water Powers of Navigable Streams,
(1927) 15 Geo. L J. 201. In the Daniel Ball, supra, the court
justified congressional jurisdiction over waters which had not
been used for interstate commerce theretofore, but were suscep-
tible of being so used. In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall, 713,
18 L. Ed. 96 (1865), a more complete federalization of navigable
waters was accomplished. The court held that commerce in-
cluded navigation, that the power to regulate commerce compre-
hends control, for that purpose and to the extent necessary, of
all the navigable waters of the United States, which are acces-
sible from a state other than that in which it lies; that for this
purpose, they are public property of the nation and subject to the
requisite control of Congress. This necessarily includes the
power to keep open and free from any obstruction to navigation,
interposed by the states or otherwise; to remove such obstruc-
tions when they exist, and to provide for the punishment of of-
fenders. For those purposes Congress possessed all the powers
which existed in the states before the adoption of the National
Constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament
of England. It is for Congress to determine when its power shall
be brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions
which shall be provided.
The conclusive demonstration that the courts have created
an independent life for the legal concept of navigation, based on
the necessity of eliminating state-created barriers to national
economic development, came in Arizona v. California, 283 U. S.
423, 51 S. Ct. 522, 75 L. Ed. 1154 (1931), where the Supreme
Court held a simple congressional declaration that the shallow
and rapid Colorado River was, in fact, navigable, justification
for federal control, regardless of unanimous contrary testimony
by regional hydrologic experts as to its actual navigability.
Projects not affecting navigable waters require a license from
the Federal Water Power Commission for the construction of
dams or structures on rivers, even though they be not listed as
navigable waters or affected with interstate commerce. 16 U. S.
C. (sec.) 817. Section twenty-three of the present Act requires
projects in non-traversible streams to be licensed, whenever the
Commission finds "that the interests of interstate or foreign
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commerce would be affected by such proposed construction .... "
49 Stat. 846 (1935). Thus once a relationship of the proposed
project to navigation, either foreign or interstate, is found there
is no longer a question as to the right of the Federal Water
Power Commission to control such project very effectively.
THOMAS McCARTY,
Third Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In The First National Bank of Waseca, a Corporation, Respt., v. William
L. Paulson, as Administrator with the Will Annexed of the Estate of A. P.
Paulson, deceased, et al., Applts.
That Section 7639 C. L. 1913, which provides that in giving decision the
trial court must state the facts found and the conclusions separately, does
not apply where the final decision is embodied in and evidenced by an order,
and no judgment is required to be entered.
That said Section 7639 C. L. 1913, is applicable only to cases where there
is a trial by the court of an issue of fact, arising upon material averments,
presented by formal pleadings, and where following the findings, a judgment
must be entered.
That said Section 7639 C. L. 1913, does not apply to an order confirming
a mortgage foreclosure sale, entered pursuant to Section 2, Chapter 165, Laws
of 1939.
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Jansonius, J.
Action by the First National Bank of Waseca against William L. Paulson,
et al., to foreclose a mortgage on real property.
Plaintiff appeals from an order confirming a mortgage foreclosure sale.
AFItIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
In Nome State Bank, a corporation, Respt., v. Melvin Brendmoen and
Edna Brendmoen, Applts.
That in an action between a mortgagee and mortgagor for the foreclos-
ure of a chattel mortgage an allegation in the complaint to the effect that
the mortgagee surrendered a copy of the mortgage to the mortgagor is not
essential to the statement of a cause of action.
That the failure of a mortgagee to surrender to the mortgagor a copy of
a chattel mortgage at the time of the execution thereof does not render the
mortgage void as between the parties thereto.
Appeal from the District Court of Barnes County, Hon. M. J. Englert, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Nanna M. Funk and C. E. Branick, Applts., v. L. R. Baird and T. A.
Tollefson, Respts.
That in an action for specific performance of a contract for sale of real
property, plaintiffs seek relief upon purely equitable grounds; and in order
to be entitled to such relief they must show that they are ready, willing, and
able to fully perform their part of the contract.
That as against the vendees of an executory land contract, the heirs of
the deceased vendor have no right to substitute their personal covenants for
those of the vendor, the vendees having made no contract with the heirs and
not having contracted with the vendor to take conveyance from either her
heirs or assigns.
That where, by the terms of an executory contract for the sale of land,
the vendor agreed "to convey unto the said parties of the second part, or
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their assigns, by deed of warranty and abstract of title" but did not contract
%%ith the vendor to take conveyance from either her heirs or assigns, the
heirs may not, in an action for specific performance of the contract, compel
the vendees to accept deeds of the heirs of the deceased vendor.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In St. Paul Foundry Company, a corporation, Applt., v. Burnstad School
District No. 31, of Logan County, N. D., a public school corporation, Respt.
That under the facts in this case, where the plaintiff delivered to the
defendant structural steel for the purpose of incorporating the same into a
gymnasium being built by the defendant, and the property was so incorpor-
ated and the gymnasium completed so that the structural steel could not be
returned to the plaintiff, any cause of action which the plaintiff had for the
value of such steel accrued at the time the property was delivered and in-
corporated in the building so built.
That under the provisions of Secttion 7375 of the Compiled Laws, N. D.,
1913, any action brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of such struc-
tural steel must be brought within six years from the time the cause of
action accrued in order to be maintained against the defense that the statute
of limitations had run.
Appeal from the District Court of Logan County, Hon. George M.
McKenna, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.
In State of North Dakota ex rel Dell Perry, Petr., v. Joe Garecht, as
sheriff of Stark County, Respt.
That where, after conviction for a crime, a defendant appears before the
court for sentence and the court orally pronounces judgment and sentence
upon him, the judgment so pronounced fixes the penalty imposed upon the
defendant and the court may not, in the written judgment subsequently
entered, add the requirement that the defendant serve a jail sentence in
event of nonpayment of a fine, when such jail sentence was not included In
the judgment pronounced.
That where, a defendant is held in custody under a provision in a written
judgment requiring him to serve a jail sentence in event that a fine im-
posed upon him is not paid, and such provision was not included in the oral
judgment pronounced by the court, the defendant is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus upon proper application.
Original application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Dell Perry.
Petitioner entitled to Writ. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Joseph P. Durick, Pltf. and Applt., v. Oscar W. Winters, doing busi-
ness as the Dacotah Cab Company, or 444 Cab, and George Richards, Defts.,
and Oscar W. Winters, doing business as the Dacotah Cab Company, or 444
Cab, Deft. and Respt.
That a motion for a new trial, based upon the insufficiency of the evi-
dence, is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and
its action thereon will not be disturbed unless it is shown there was an abuse
of such discretion..
That an order granting a new trial stands upon firmer ground than one
denying the same, as the outcome results merely in a reinvestigation of the
entire issue on the merits.
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Grand Forks'County grant-
ing a new trial, Hon. P. G. Swenson, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
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In Carl S. Brye, Pltf. and Respt., v. William E. Greenfield, et al., and
State of North Dakota, Defts., and State of North Dakota, Applt.
That a complaint in an action to determine adverse claims to real
property, which alleges that the state claims an interest in said property
adverse to the plaintiff, and which fails to allege that the plaintiff filed an
undertaking to pay any costs which may be adjudged against him in favor
of the state, is not vulnerable to a demurrer by the state, alleging that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Dunham Lumber Company v. Gresz, et al., 70 N. D., 295 N. W. 500, followed.
Appeal from the District Court of Benson County, Hon. W. J. Kneeshaw,
Judge. Per Curiam Opinion.
In Mrs. Frances Booke, Pltf. and Respt., v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That an injury compensable from the Workmen's Compensation fund
is an "injury by accident" arising in the course of employment, or a "disease
approximately caused by the employment."
That the burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that the death
of a former employee was the result of an injury by accident arising in the
course of his employment, or the result of a disease approximately caused by
the employment.
That where the death of a former employee is shown to be the result of
the chronic heart condition known as angina pectoris, and the death occurred
after the employment had ceased, it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove
that this diseased condition was approximately caused by the employment,
and such burden is not sustained where the proof is purely speculative and
the record is silent as to the origin of the diseased condition.
That where a former employee died from agina pectoris some time after
his employment had ceased, and the record shows that the attack was super-
induced by exertion in walking and exposure to extreme cold, it is held:
that claimant has failed to prove that this diseased condition was approxi-
mately caused by the former employment or was the result of an injury by
accident occurring in said employment..
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Miller, J.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In Mrs. Florence Moug, Pltf. and Respt., v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That Appellate courts determine only questions actually before them on
appeal, and necessary for the decision of the case, and will not give opinions
upon questions of law that are dependent upon a state of facts not estab-
lished by the evidence.
That the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act provides for com-
pensation only for "an injury arising in the course of employment."
That an injury is received in the course of the employment when it comes
while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform.
That on an appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau disallowing a claim for compensation for injury, the claimant has
the burden of proving that the injury for which compensation is claimed
was received in the course of the employment.
That in the instant case it is held that the evidence fails to show that
the injury for which compensattion is claimed was received in the course of
employment.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Englert, J.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
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In J. H. Goldberg, Applt., v. John Gray, Tax Commissioner, Respt.
That the phrase "income derived from any source whatever" as used in
Section 17, chapter 312, S. L. N. D. 1923, as amended by chapter 253, S. I.
N. D. 1933, refers to the origin of the income, unrestricted by situs or loca-
tion.
That tax statutes are construed most strictly against the government and
in favor of the citizen.
That the purpose sought to be attained by the construction of any statute
is to arrive at the intention of the lawmaking body that enacted it.
That the term "gross income" as defined in the income tax includes a
resident partner's share of the net profits of a partnership that does business
wholly outside the state of North Dakota.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Jansonius, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In James Glinz and Christ Zurcher, Pltfs. and Respts., v. The State of
North Dakota doing business as The State Hail Insurance Department, et al.,
Defts. and Applts.
That no insurance issued under the provisions of chapter 137, Session
Laws N. D. 1933, takes effect until the application for insurance is actually
received in the office of the Hail Insurance Department.
That where a crop is struck by hail at any time before the application
for the policy is filed with the Hail Insurance Department, no policy issued
under the provisions of the aforesaid act becomes effective.
That a crop is not "struck by hail" within the provisions of said chapter,
unless the hail has caused material damage to the crop. Issendorf v. State,
69 N. D. 56, 283 N. W. 783, followed.
That damage to the crop means substantial damage, some injury by Which
the value is diminished or destroyed, an actual injury not determined by per-
centage merely, but a damage that is visible, observable, and material.
That evidence is examined and it is held: that before the application for
insurance involved in this case was received by the Hail Insurance Depart-
ment, the crop sought to be insured had been "struck by hail", and, there-
fore, there was no liability under the insurance policy.
Appeal from the District Court of Bottineau County, Hon. G. Grimson,
Judge.
REVERSED AND DISMISSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In Eleanor Bentley, Pltf. and Respt., v. Oldetyme Distillers, Inc., a cor-
poration, Deft. and Applt.
That a general agent has authority to do everything necessary or proper
and useful in the ordinary course of business for effecting the purpose of his
agency.
That where an agency is proved by competent evidence, declarations of
the agent made within the scope of his authority may be shown.
That evidence examined and it is held: the record shows that defendant's
agent, acting within the scope of his authority, was conveying plaintiff on the
business of the defendant; that at that time the plaintiff vas injured by the
negligence of the defendant, and without contributory negligence on her
part; and that the damages assessed against the principal were not excessive.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred
Jansonius, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J Nuessle, Morris, JJ.
and Lowe, Dist. J., concur specially. Burke, J., disqualified did not partici.
pate, Lowe Dist. J. sitting.
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M. L. McBride, Editor
Entered as Second Class Matter, Dec. 9, 1936, at the Postoffice at
Dickinson, North Dakota, Under the Act of August 24, 1912.
VOL. 17. MAY, 1941. NO. 6.
NEW LOGAN-WALTER BILL
The history of the struggle of the Logan-Walter
bill, intended to govern by law federal officers and
agencies, is told in the March and April, 1941, num-
bers of the A.B.A. Journal. The House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association at its meeting on
March 17th, 1941, adopted a statement of principles,
and expressed the opinion that Senate Bill 674, intro-
duced by Senator Hatch, best embodied such prin-
ciples. Since then, Congressman Walter has intro-
duced H. R. 4238 in the House, which is almost the
identical bill.
Hearings have commenced in the Senate and will
probably continue for a month or six weeks. Num-
erous federal agencies are attacking the bill and they
are, for the most part, insisting that their agencies be
exempt therefrom. No one expects them to agree to
any legislation which will in any considerable measure
affect their powers and jurisdiction.
We must depend upon the lawyers in the respective
states organizing and conducting such a campaign of
education with the State Medical Associations, State
American Legions, farm groups, patriotic groups and
others, to support the Senators and Congressmen from
the respective states in their fight for this legislation.
The American people, of all classes and professions,
made a magnificent fight in behalf of the Logan-
Walter bill and we can make an even better one
(Continued on Next Page)
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in behalf of the two bills I have mentioned, if the various state
organizations and groups will inform themselves with respect
thereto, and lend their active and vigorous assistance. The
people and not the politicians will save this country from totali-
tarianism if it can be saved.
I therefore urge that every lawyer write our Senators and
Congressmen asking them to support this worthy legislation and
that you interest others to do the same.
H. G. NILLES,
President.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS
Washington, D. C.-Impetus to the work of the National Con-
ference of Judicial Councils was given at a luncheon here, held
in connection with the meeting of the American Law Institute, at
which members of the conference heard reports on what Ameri-
can lawyers are doing during the emergency and how their Eng-
lish brethren are carrying on under war conditions.
Sir Wilfred A. Greene, Master of the Rolls of England, and
Dr. Arthur L. Goodhart, professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford
University, gave off-the-record talks on conditions there. Other
speakers were Jacob M. Lashly, president of the American Bar
Association; Solicitor General Francis Biddle; and Judge Edward
R. Finch, chairman of the conference. Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
chairman of the conference Executive Committee, presided.
In attendance at the luncheon were Attorney General Jack-
son; justices of the United States Supreme Court; senior judges
of the federal circuit court of appeals from several districts;
judges of the United States Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia; chief justices of state supreme courts; law school
deans, and others.
VACATION OF JUDGMENTS - EXTRINSIC AND
INTRINSIC FRAUD
The principle that there has to be an end to litigation and
that when a party has had his day in court the judgment thus
rendered shall be final was first enunciated in 1702 by the Lord
Keeper in the High Court of Chancery in the case of Tovey v.
Young, 2 Vern. 437, S. C., 24 Eng. Rep. R. 93 (1702).
In the vacating of judgments, fraud plays an important part.
Generally, fraud justifying equntable relief against enforcement
of the judgment must be extrinsic to the issues. Con't. Nat'l
Bank v. Holland Bank Co., 66 F. (2d) 823 (C.C.A. Mo. 1933). The
leading case of United States v. Throckmorten, 98 U. S. 61, 25
L. ed. 93 (1878), held that fraudulent acts which will move a court
of equity to set aside or annul a judgment or decree relate to
frauds which are extrinsic to matters tried by the first court.
